Non-intrusive IP Traceback for DDoS Attacks by Thing, V et al.
Non-Intrusive IP Traceback for DDoS Attacks 
Vrizlynn L. L. Thing 
vlt@doc.ic.ac.uk 
Morris Sloman 
mss@doc.ic.ac.uk 
 
Imperial College London 
180 Queen’s Gate, London, SW72HR 
 
Naranker Dulay 
nd@doc.ic.ac.uk 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The paper describes a Non-Intrusive IP traceback scheme which 
uses sampled traffic under non-attack conditions to build and 
maintains caches of the valid source addresses transiting network 
routers. Under attack conditions, route anomalies are detected by 
determining which routers have been used for unknown source 
addresses, in order to construct the attack graph. Results of 
simulation studies are presented. Our approach does not require 
changes to the Internet routers or protocols. Precise information 
regarding the attack is not required allowing a wide variety of 
DDoS attack detection techniques to be used. Our algorithm is 
simple and efficient, allowing for a fast traceback and the scheme 
is scalable due to the distribution of processing workload.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Attackers use spoofed source addresses to hide their identity and 
location in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks [1].  
Some service providers do perform ingress filtering to check for 
valid source IP addresses coming into access routers, but this is 
not completely effective. Recent studies show source address 
spoofing is still a major network problem [2], [3]. Traceback 
mechanisms [4-6] trace the true source of the attackers to stop the 
attack at the point nearest to its source to reduce waste of network 
resources and to find the attackers’ identities.  
Packets belonging to a particular source-destination pair typically 
follow a relatively static path through the network as routing 
tables are not updated very frequently under normal conditions. 
When an attacker spoofs a legitimate source address, the packet 
may pass through routers which are not on the normal source-
destination routing path and this anomaly can be used to 
determine the attack path. Based on this rationale, we propose a 
Non-Intrusive IP traceback scheme. Our scheme builds and 
maintains caches of valid source addresses for routers in the 
network from sampled traffic under non-attack conditions. Under 
attack conditions, we determine which routers have been used for 
unknown source addresses, to construct the attack graph within an 
administrative domain. The strengths of this scheme are its 
scalability due to the distribution of processing workload and 
speed due to the simple computation for the attack graph 
construction. There is no need to modify existing routers, victim 
or internet protocols to support the traceback, so it is “non-
intrusive”unlike many other existing techniques [4-6]. This 
scheme supports the tracing of both internal (e.g. zombies within 
the victim network) and external attackers.  
2. KEY ASSUMPTION 
Our design makes the key assumption that end-to-end routes are 
relatively stable as indicated by analysis of 40000 end-to-end 
routes  between 37 Internet sites, in [7]. Prevalence of a dominant 
route (i.e. the route that appears most often) is computed as the 
ratio of the number of times the dominant route is observed to the 
total number of traceroutes measuring a particular path. The 
median value of prevalence is 82%, 97% and 100% at host, city 
and autonomous system granularity respectively. This indicated 
that Internet paths were strongly dominated by a single route. 
Although the time periods over which routes persisted 
demonstrated a wide variation, ranging from seconds to days, 
about 2/3 of the Internet paths had routes persisting for either days 
or weeks. 
Routing stability based on data captured from the National 
Internet Measurement Infrastructure (NIMI) and a set of 189 
public traceroute servers was studied in [8]. Of the NIMI paths, 
78% always exhibited the same route, and 86% of the routes had a 
prevalence of 90% or higher. For the public servers, the 
corresponding figures are 73% and 85% respectively. It was also 
shown that routes often persist for at least a day. In general, 1/3 of 
the Internet routes and 1/6 of the NIMI routes are short-lived.  
A study on routing fluctuations [9] concluded that the vast 
majority of Internet routing instability stems from only a small 
number of unpopular destinations. Popular destinations, which are 
responsible for the bulk of the Internet, have remarkably stable 
routes lasting days or weeks, probably due to the fact that they 
have reliable and well-managed connections to the Internet. 
The above studies showed that the Internet routes exhibit 
relatively high stability so our approach to caching routing 
information in white lists should not result in very frequent and 
erratic changes to the lists.  
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3. NON-INTRUSIVE TRACEBACK 
If node A spoofs node B’s address to send traffic to node C, an 
“incorrect” path (or anomalous intermediate routers) can be 
detected. The routers on the A-C path will suddenly ”see” B’s 
source address rather than the routers on the valid B-C path. By 
performing source IP address validation checks on whether transit 
packets are supposed to arrive at particular routers, these packets 
could be identified as from legitimate or illegitimate users, with a 
low false positive rate. Therefore, even seemingly legitimate 
packets, used in attacks would still be traceable. 
In our scheme, network routers use standard flow sampling and 
reporting mechanisms such as Netflow [10] and IPFIX [11, 12], to 
update their assigned White List (WL) caching device. The 
required fields of the flow include the source and destination 
addresses from the original data packets. Each cached record 
consists of the above fields, the address of the router that sent the 
data and the time of receipt to expire the record.  
The WL caching devices will update the white lists for the routers 
during the learning stage, i.e. only when there is no ongoing 
DDoS attack, to prevent spoofed source addresses from being 
included in the caches. We assume a DDoS attack would be 
detected using mechanisms such as TCP SYN flood [13]. During 
the attack, traffic sampling from the routers is still sent to the WL 
caches, but the white list generation and updates are suspended 
upon attack detection. The WL caching devices search for 
mismatches between the sampled traffic and cache data. These 
anomalies are sent to the Traceback Manager to generate the 
attack graphs. 
One of the main goals of traceback is to locate the points closest 
to the attack sources in order to mitigate the attack by effective 
filtering or rate-limiting. Therefore, instead of having coverage of 
all routers within a domain such as a campus network, it is suffice 
to perform monitoring at strategic points such as nodes in the 
network where incoming and outgoing traffic will definitely 
traverse. To pin-point the strategic points, we classify attackers 
into internal (e.g. zombies within the victim network) or external. 
Ingress routers are the strategic points to perform monitoring or 
traffic sampling to trace external attackers. However, for the 
internal attackers, we have to know the network topology to 
perform monitoring on the routers one hop away from the victim. 
By reducing the number of routers participating in the traffic 
sampling and flow exporting, the workload and overhead traffic is 
significantly reduced. This is a very important enhancement 
considering that traceback is to be performed during the 
occurrence of a DDoS attack when the victim’s network is under 
heavy load. Another advantage of this scheme is due to the small 
number of routers involved, a single Traceback Manager with 
built-in WL caching functionality could be in charge of the whole 
network, therefore consolidating the information storage and 
processing at a central point. This would allow faster processing 
and a global view of the traffic flows in the domain, making it 
easier to identify anomalous flows.  
4. DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
Our traceback approach is non-intrusive, in that it is not necessary 
to make any changes to the routers assisting in the traceback 
process. Built-in traffic sampling/monitoring and exporting tools 
in routers could be used to sample and report the required 
information to the WL caching devices. If such tools are not built 
in the routers, we can instead make use of monitoring devices by 
installing them along the network paths.  
An important issue is when to suspend the learning process in 
order to prevent records of the attack traffic flow being included 
in the white list, thereby corrupting it. The DDoS attack detection 
mechanism triggers  traceback and  stops the learning  process. As  
 
there will always be a finite delay in detecting an attack, the 
records of sampled traffic are first written in to a whitelist buffer. 
The interval for the buffer to confirm entries into the white list 
cache depends on the attack detection speed. For example, if the 
attack detection mechanism takes x secs and the time to inform 
the Traceback Manager of the attack takes y secs, the buffer 
flushing interval would be x+y secs.  
In order to estimate white list size, we referred to [14] which 
shows that Amazon.com experienced 630,000 visitors in a single 
hour on its busiest day in 2003. By having a white list cache for a 
protected server in an IPv4 network, each record would need 4 
bytes for the source address, 4 for the router and 8 for the tick 
counts in milliseconds = 16 bytes total which implies 4.8 MB 
needed to store 30 minutes of white list records. 
5. SIMULATIONS 
 
 
Figure 1: Simulation scenario 
 
We have carried out simulations in ns-2. During the learning 
phase, nodes generate legitimate traffic to the target/victim and 
the Traceback Manager builds the white list. When the attack 
traffic is started, the white list updating is suspended and 
traceback is started, but the legitimate nodes continue to generate 
new or existing flows’ traffic at a probability (to simulate random 
traffic).  
Figure 1 shows 100 attackers and 120 legitimate nodes. The 
attackers send attack traffic with randomly spoofed addresses in 
the range of 1 to 10000 (which includes the addresses of 
legitimate nodes). The strategic points are R1, R2, R3 and R4, 
which are the entry points to the network. The links from the 
legitimate nodes and the attackers into the network are set to 
10Mbps with a propagation delay of 30ms to reflect the Internet 
delays. The internal links are set to 100Mbps with a propagation 
delay of 10ms.  During the learning phase, each of the legitimate 
nodes, N1 to N100, sent traffic to the victim V at the rate of 5 
pkts/sec. R1 to R4 sampled traffic at a probability of 0.01 and sent 
them to the Traceback Manager. The learning period was set to 20 
secs. We ran 3 sets of simulations and the attacks were started at 
the 20th sec with rates of 20, 50 or 100 pkts/sec, per attack node. 
During the attack, all the legitimate nodes (including N101 to 
N120 which were simulating new legitimate requests) generated 
traffic with a “decide to send” probability1 of 0.5 at a rate of 5 
pkts/sec per node. The attack lasted for 1.5 secs.  
 R1 and R3 were successfully detected. Table 1 shows the 
statistics collected, of the number of mismatch packets detected. 
The time is from the start of the attack and the results are 
displayed as RX(Y), where X refers to the router’s ID and Y refers 
to the number of mismatch packets detected. The time, t, taken to 
first detect mismatch packets for both R1 and R3, was 140ms, 
80ms and 70ms for attack rates of 20, 50 and 100 pkts/sec, 
respectively. At t ms, a total of 3, 3 and 4 sampled packets were 
received by the Traceback Manager, of which 2, 2 and 3 were 
mismatch packets, for the attack rates of 20, 50 and 100 pkts/sec, 
respectively. 
Table 1: Mismatched packets 
Attack Rate 
pkts/sec  
t ms 0.5 sec 1 sec 1.5 sec  
(attack 
stopped) 
20 R1(1) 
R3(1) 
R1(5) R3(4) R1(11) 
R3(13) 
R1(15) 
R3(17) R4(1) 
50 R1(1) 
R3(1) 
R1(15) 
R3(10) R4(1) 
R1(24) 
R3(26) R4(1) 
R1(34) 
R3(39) R4(2) 
100 R1(1) 
R3(2) 
R1(23) 
R3(24) 
R1(43) 
R3(56) 
R1(69) 
R3(91) R2(1) 
The results show false positives were detected. R2 (for attack rate 
of 100 pkts/sec) and R4 (for attack rates of 20 and 50 pkts/sec) 
were detected for mismatched packets. This is due to sampling 
from the new legitimate traffic not found in the white list. We also 
observe that as time progresses, false positives started appearing. 
However, the difference between the number of mismatch packets 
sampled for R1,R3 and R2,R4 widens too. At 0.5 sec, the 
smallest-gap ratio (worst case) was 1/10. At 1.5 sec, the smallest-
gap ratio was 1/15, 1/17 and 1/69 for attack rates of 20, 50 and 
100 pkts/sec. Therefore, threshold values can be safely set so that 
false positives are ignored in a real-world scenario. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We have implemented a non-intrusive traceback technique based 
on the rationale that packets relating to a particular source-
destination flow follow a relatively static path through routers. If 
an attacker spoofs a legitimate user’s address, an “incorrect” path 
can be detected.  
Simulations conducted showed routers forwarding attack packets 
were successfully traced. We achieved detection rate of 140ms, 
80ms and 70ms for attack rate of 20, 50 and 100 pkts/sec. We 
observed that as the attack rate increases, the detection is faster 
and the difference in the number of mismatch packets from attack 
and new legitimate traffic increases. This allows a threshold to be 
set to ignore false positives. 
Due to the differences in the way our system and the other 
existing traceback techniques are triggered, quantitative analysis 
and comparison are not practical. However, we presented a 
qualitative analysis comparing our scheme with other traceback 
techniques. Our approach is non-intrusive, not requiring any 
changes to be made to the Internet routers and precise information 
                                                                 
1 Legitimate traffic during attack is generated at 5 pkts/sec. 
However, a random generator is used to determine whether to 
generate each packet, with a probability of 0.5. 
regarding the attack is not required so we can use a wide variety 
of DDoS attack detection techniques. The logging and 
computation tasks are shifted to the WL caching devices and 
Traceback Manager, and therefore relieving the victim from 
additional burden. Changes to the original data packets are also 
not required. As the learning phase is conducted before the attack, 
once the attack is detected, mismatch checking can be conducted 
at once to determine routers carrying attack traffic. Our algorithm 
is also simple and efficient, allowing for a fast generation of the 
attack graph and is scalable due to the distribution of processing 
workload. 
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